USAID ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM EFFICACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

August 3, 2018

# Table of Contents

1. Acronyms

ADISS	Ghana Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening
AHADI	Kenya Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions
CAR	Central African Republic
CARPE	Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CEPESCL	Creating an Enabling Policy Environment in Sierra Leone
COP	Chief of Party
DACP	Djibouti Anticorruption Program
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRG	Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FY	Fiscal Year
GEMS	Liberia Governance and Economic Management Support
GSAM	Ghana Supporting Accountability Mechanisms
LAVI	Liberia Accountability and Voice Initiative
LPAC	Liberia Legal Professional Development and Anti-Corruption
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
OGP	Open Government Partnership
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking System
PO-RALG	President's Office – Regional Authority for Local Government, Tanzania
PRADD	Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development
SIAPS	Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services
STAR	Tanzania Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsibility
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
ZTP	Zambia Threshold Program

2. Acknowledgments

3. Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of USAID programming in meeting anti-corruption goals in sub-Saharan Africa. The research will serve as a foundation for informing future anti-corruption program design and implementation, and may lead to further analysis. The research team focused on 90 USAID programs over the past decade with a stated focus, in whole or in part, on anti-corruption, accountability, transparency or integrity. They read available documents and interviewed USAID staff associated with the programs. The review included programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption and those with another focus that contained anti-corruption sub-objectives, indicators or reporting.

USAID'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTFOLIO IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2008 – 2018

THE RESEARCH TEAM:

Reviewed **96** program documents

Conducted **16** interviews with **31** USAID staff

Identified **90** anticorruption programs in Sub-Saharan Africa

PROJECTS OVER TIME BY SECTORS

■ Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
■ Cross-Sectoral Programs

FOCUS ON ANTICORRUPTION

33 Primary Anticorruption Programs

57 Secondary Anticorruption Programs

ADDRESS SUPPLY, DEMAND, OR BOTH

45 Supply and Demand Programs

33 Supply Programs

12 Demand Programs

COVERED 25 COUNTRIES

Findings

The review revealed trends in the levels and areas of focus of programming over the period 2008 to 2018. The amount of anti-corruption programming has been somewhat stable over the period, although it experienced a notable uptick between 2014 and 2017, followed by a drop in 2018. The drop may reflect the decrease in DRG funding for the region. Anti-corruption programming occurred more often in the civil society, local governance and rule of law sub-sectors and less often in non-DRG sectors such as economic growth, natural resource management and health. The majority of anti-corruption programs combined demand- and supply-side approaches, working with both civil society to "demand" and government to "supply" anti-corruption measures. Although combining both demand- and supply-side approaches in a single program is considered a best practice, the period witnessed a steady increase in programs focused only on the demand for anti-corruption measures.

Programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption represented a little more than a third of all anti-corruption related programs. By and large, USAID's programming with a primary focus on anti-corruption occurred in countries categorized as Free or Partly Free by Freedom House. With more political and civic freedom, these contexts likely enabled USAID and other donors to be more open

about addressing corruption. In addition, USAID programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption occurred more often in countries with higher scores on the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator. These programs tended to combine demand- and supply-side approaches.

In countries where USAID had a clear understanding of the level of political will within the government, programs were better targeted to take advantage of opportunities and respond to constraints. In Liberia, USAID had initially overestimated some government partners' ability and willingness to tackle key reforms. They learned from this experience and their current programming is designed to adapt to emerging opportunities.[1] Even in closing political space, Missions can promote anti-corruption by focusing on sectors that align with the objectives of the government, as recent programs in Tanzania illustrate.[2]

Efforts to integrate anti-corruption into sectoral programs often adopted less sensitive language and approaches. A health program targeted "inefficiencies" rather than "corruption" as a politically acceptable starting point for governance interventions given possible sensitivities and resistance.[3] Similarly, environmental staff noted that in some cases they talk about combating crime rather than corruption, as a focus on corruption can put some government partners on the defensive.[4] Missions also strengthened service delivery across sectors, which reduced opportunities for corruption without making specific reference to corruption. In addition, staff noted how multilateral initiatives and economic incentives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, can work as levers even where political will is weak.

Recommendations

Finally, the review generated a number of recommendations for future anti-corruption programming. We highlight some of these below:

Strategic:
- *Where possible, aim to combine demand- and supply-side approaches in one program*. This review confirms previous research that identifies the linking of voice (demand) and accountability (supply) as a best practice.[5] Linking enables coordination, layering and sequencing of activities that separate awards or one-sided approaches do not. In more restrictive environments, however, linking may not be possible or advised.
- *Avoid implementing stand-alone anti-corruption programs in countries that are categorized as not free.* They are unlikely to gain the space and support to undertake direct actions against corruption and are rather more likely to serve as a political fig leaf for a repressive regime.
- *Where political will is low, consider focusing on public management systems (and public financial management systems, in particular), inefficiencies, or service delivery* at the local level that do not trigger political sensitivities.

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[1] Authors' interview with USAID/Liberia staff. June 14, 2018.
[2] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania staff. June 5, 2018.
[3] USAID. 2018. *Strengthening Governance in Pharmaceutical Systems: A Compendium of Country Case Studies.* Walkowiak H, Hafner T, Putter SJ. Submitted to the US Agency for International Development by the Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services (SIAPS) Program. Arlington, VA: Management Sciences for Health.
[4] Authors' interview with USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3) Office of Forest and Biodiversity staff. June 11, 2018.
[5] In particular, see USAID. 2015. *Practitioner's Guide for Anticorruption Programming*. Washington, DC: Management Systems International.
https://www.usaid.gov/opengov/developer/datasets/Practitioner's_Guide_for_Anticorruption_Programming_2015.pdf.

Programmatic:
- *Consider activities that may bolster political will in a counterpart ministry* through research establishing evidence of a problem, aligning with the government's broader work plans, and supporting consultative processes.
- If possible, *aim to design flexibility into programming to take advantage of reformers* coming into office or to pivot where government partners are not supportive.
- *Take advantage of multilateral initiatives* such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Open Government Partnership, where applicable, to bolster political will and increase the likelihood of program success.
- *Support donor coordination and diplomatic engagement on anti-corruption issues* to bolster political will and support anti-corruption programming.

Design:
- *Avoid overly complex or ambitious program designs* especially in low capacity environments.
- *Set realistic targets and strive for longer time frames*, recognizing that changing social attitudes and behavior are long-term propositions.
- *Use information technology to buttress and incentivize regulatory reform* or process re-engineering rather than replacing them.

4. Introduction

As corruption[6] poses a major impediment to development, fighting it has been a priority of development work since the 1990s. Anti-corruption initiatives have taken root in stand-alone or cross-cutting programs funded by donor institutions, buttressed by the entry into force of the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2005 and the establishment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011, the African Peer Review Mechanism in 2003 and other regional and global initiatives. African leaders have also identified anti-corruption as a priority, most recently in their designation of 2018 as the African Union's Year of Anti-Corruption.

Against this backdrop, current USAID policy places a premium on empowering partner countries to transition to independent stewardship of their development, yet corruption undermines countries' progress toward self-reliance. The diversion of national revenues to corrupt individuals saps resources and necessitates greater international support. State capture also distorts nations' priorities away from public interests, and lower-level administrative corruption discourages civic participation and burdens the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of society.

USAID identifies anti-corruption as a key cross-cutting priority, and has produced valuable tools for assessing corruption, designing anti-corruption programs, and training staff on best practices.[7] There are ample opportunities to apply these resources in sub-Saharan Africa. While there have been high-level reviews of USAID's corruption-related work,[8] there remains a significant knowledge gap regarding the types and results of USAID's anti-corruption programming in Africa. Improving the Agency's anti-corruption work in sub-Saharan Africa requires a thorough and systematic accounting of past and ongoing programming related to the sector.

5. Study Objectives

The purpose of this study is to catalogue USAID programming and analyze the results in combating corruption in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade. This research effort will inform future anti-corruption program design and implementation and serve to maximize the impact of future USAID investments in anti-corruption. The research may also lead to more in-depth analysis on targeted topics.

This report is organized into nine sections. The executive summary offers highlights of the report's findings; the introduction describes why USAID is interested in furthering its knowledge of anti-corruption programming; the third section describes what USAID hopes to achieve with this study; and the fourth section describes the methodology and limitations of the study. The report then analyzes patterns of anti-corruption programming in sub-Saharan Africa, effectiveness of the programming, and best approaches to integrating anti-corruption in sectoral programs in sections five through seven. Conclusions and recommendations for future anti-corruption programming follow in sections eight and nine. The annexes contain the scope of work for this study, the program inventory that the authors analyzed, and a list of key informant interviewees.

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[6] Following USAID's policy, we define corruption as "the abuse of entrusted authority for private gain." United States Agency for International Development (USAID), USAID Anticorruption Strategy, Washington, D.C., 2005: pg. 8. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/200mbo.pdf.

[7] USAID's anti-corruption tools are available here, https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/technical-publications.

[8] USAID. 2014. *Analysis of USAID Anticorruption Programming Worldwide (2007-2013): Final Report.* Management Systems International. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/AnalysisUSAIDAnticorruptionProgrammingWorldwideFinalReport2007-2013.pdf.

6. Methodology and Limitations

Methodology

To undertake this review, the research team catalogued USAID programming and analyzed the results in combating corruption in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade. The criteria for including a program in the database were its stated focus, in whole or in part, on anti-corruption, accountability, transparency or integrity. The database included programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption and those with another focus that contained anti-corruption sub-objectives, indicators or reporting. The review included programming primarily in the democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) sector, but also in other development sectors.

Although most, if not all, DRG programs contribute to accountability systems and therefore to anti-corruption efforts at least to some extent, the authors only included those programs that referenced doing so in their documentation. How we treated elections programming illustrates our selection criteria. While strengthening civic participation in elections may enable voters to hold elected officials accountable and therefore provides an indirect support to anti-corruption goals, most elections programs do not identify anti-corruption and accountability as specific objectives. Therefore, we did not include them in our database. However, if an elections program had a specific focus on money in politics, political party financing or vote buying, for example, we would have included it in our database. As it happened, we did not find any elections programs in this time period that met those criteria.

Similarly, media strengthening programs support the ability of independent news outlets to inform the public and offer alternative points of view, which enables voters to hold government officials accountable, but many such programs make no reference to anti-corruption goals. If a program supported investigative journalism or its documents made reference to media reporting on corruption, then we included it in the database. For example, we included the Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening program in Ghana, in part, because the mid-term evaluation discussed its "support for access to timeslots on popular radio talk shows structured around informing citizens about corruption with a Q&A segment for listener input," and "training of journalists in investigative methods to cover stories from districts."[9]

Data Collection

Using the selection criteria described above, the research team identified 80 country-based programs where anti-corruption was either a primary or secondary focus as well as 10 regional or global anti-corruption initiatives that operated in sub-Saharan Africa between 2008 and 2018. The research team identified this sample of relevant programs via multiple avenues. First, it drew from the program inventory found in USAID's *Analysis of USAID Anticorruption Programming Worldwide (2007-2013)*. Second, USAID's Africa Bureau provided a list of programs and assisted with collecting program reports that were not publicly available. Third, key informant interviews provided insights into specific USAID Mission portfolios and initiatives. Fourth, the authors conducted keyword searches on Google, USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Evaluation Catalog. Keywords included: integrity, transparency, corruption, accountability, governance, and organized crime as well as program names when they were known. Search tools were used to limit searches where appropriate to the correct time period, geography, and file types.

The research team also conducted 16 interviews with 31 current and former USAID staff, who were engaged in the programs under review. While the team had only planned to do 5-8 interviews, limited

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[9] USAID. 2017. *Mid-term Performance Evaluation of Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity*. The Mitchell Group. September 2017. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00N24F.pdf

program documentation prompted us to increase the number of interviews to make up for this shortcoming.

The review includes consideration of anti-corruption efforts by other USG agencies and donors to provide context of the overall development environment and impact on reducing corruption. In some countries, initiatives supported by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the US State Department, the World Bank, the European Union and Department for International Development (DFID) or others influenced the program design and results. The team collected this information in the review of program documents and interviews.

Data Analysis

The research team developed a list of variables to code from the data sources. Basic program information included program name, start and end year, program value, program description, implementing partner, sector, whether anti-corruption was a primary or secondary focus, and whether the program focused on supply or demand-side efforts.

The research team then analyzed final reports, mid-term and final evaluations (where available) and interview notes to identify if the program met its expectations and what anti-corruption efforts were effective.[10] Effectiveness reflected USAID, implementing partner and evaluators' judgments that were based on familiarity with the programs and qualitative evidence but only sporadic quantitative data. The research team noted factors that were internal to a program that could affect its success or failure. These included program design, staffing, funding and time. The team also noted factors external to a program to account for the government's political will and the level of civil society and donor engagement in a country when considering what worked or did not work.

The initial intent was to quantify our findings in order to facilitate comparison across cases. However, the quality of the available data varied greatly from program to program which made it difficult to quantify program attributes consistently across programs. The research team adapted its approach to be more qualitative to show trends over time and capture key lessons.

The research team also collected data on Freedom House scores and the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator to provide further context for USAID's anti-corruption programming in each country.

A focused literature review provided additional context for evaluating USAID anti-corruption programming in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature focused on research conducted on African anti-corruption interventions and their results by other donors or host countries as well as analyses of global anti-corruption results.

Limitations

One limitation to the research was the low number of program documents available online on the Development Experience Clearinghouse and the variable quality of data in the documents. To mitigate this, the research team contacted USAID staff who were directly involved in programming. The time available for interviews with key informants posed another limitation, but the research benefited greatly from the 16 interviews that the research team conducted in the time allotted by the contract.

In addition, the broad scope of anti-corruption programming and its integration across sectors limited the precision with which the research team captured all relevant programs. The multiple steps involved in data collection attempted to mitigate this limitation, but the database cannot be considered exhaustive. Finally, the determination of programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption versus those with a secondary focus was not always clear. The research team laid out criteria for making that

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[10] We used the term "effective" to mean whether a program was successful in producing an intended result.

distinction, discussed above, but it did entail a judgment call in a few cases that relied on the research team's expertise.

7. Patterns of USAID Anti-Corruption Programming in Sub-Saharan Africa

The research catalogued patterns of USAID anti-corruption programming in the region. It looked at programming trends over time and in countries characterized by different levels of freedom.

All Programs

The total number of USAID anti-corruption programs in sub-Saharan Africa has been somewhat stable over the period, although there was an increase from under 40 programs per year prior to 2014 to over 50 programs between 2014 and 2017, and subsequently a drop back close to 40 programs in 2018 (see Figure 1). The drop since 2017 may reflect the decrease in DRG funding in the preceding couple of years (given the lag between program budgets and implementation).[11]

Figure 1. Evolution of primary and secondary programs over time.

NUMBER OF PROJECTS OVER TIME

Primary or Secondary Focus

As noted above, this research distinguishes between those programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption and those with a secondary focus on anti-corruption. Those with a primary focus on anti-corruption have an explicit and typically public mission statement of reducing corruption: these

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[11] Authors' interview with USAID/Washington staff. June 1, 2018.

programs include efforts to strengthen independent agencies (anti-corruption agencies, ombudsmen, supreme audit institutions, information commissioners and similar institutions) and support civil society in raising public awareness, serving as citizen and media watchdogs, and advocating for anti-corruption reforms. Programs with a secondary focus on anti-corruption contribute to improving the environment for anti-corruption without this explicit objective guiding the work. They include efforts to improve government efficiency or performance in areas such as civil service, judicial, health, education, business licensing or tax reforms, but also make reference to anti-corruption, accountability, transparency or integrity in their sub-objectives, indicators or reporting.

The balance between programs with a primary focus and those with a secondary focus on anti-corruption has remained fairly stable over this period. As seen in Figure 1, programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption have represented less than a fourth of all anti-corruption related programs in a given year (though more than a third of all programs for the overall period).[12]

Figure 2. Freedom House freedom rankings in sub-Saharan Africa, 2018

FREEDOM IN SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES, 2018

FREE	PARTLY FREE	NOT FREE
BENIN ●	BURKINA FASO	ANGOLA ●
BOTSWANA	COMOROS	BURUNDI ●
CAPE VERDE	CÔTE D'IVOIRE ●●●	CHAD
GHANA ●●●●	GAMBIA, THE	CAMEROON
MAURITIUS	GUINEA ●	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ●
NAMIBIA	GUINEA BISSAU	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ●●●●
SENEGAL ●●●	KENYA ●●●●●●	DJIBOUTI ●
SOUTH AFRICA	LESOTHO	ERITREA
	LIBERIA ●●●●●●●●●●●●	EQUATORIAL GUINEA
	MADAGASCAR ●	ETHIOPIA
	MALAWI ●●	GABON
	MALI ●●●●	MAURITANIA
	MOZAMBIQUE ●●●●●	REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
	NIGER ●●	RWANDA
	NIGERIA ●●●●●	SOMALIA ●
	SEYCHELLES	SOUTH SUDAN ●●●
	SIERRA LEONE ●●	SUDAN
	TANZANIA ●●●●●●●●	SWAZILAND
	TOGO	ZIMBABWE ●●●
	UGANDA ●●●	
	ZAMBIA ●●●●	

● NUMBER OF PRIMARY
● NUMBER OF SECONDARY

Source: freedomhouse.org

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[12] This difference is explained by the shorter duration of programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption.

In sub-Saharan Africa, USAID has concentrated programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption in countries with more political and civic freedom. As seen in Figure 2, USAID programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption occur mostly in countries that are categorized as Free or Partly Free by Freedom House.[13] A small program (a budget of $343,372) in Djibouti in 2008-2010 is the sole case of a USAID program with a primary focus on anti-corruption occurring in a country categorized as not free.

This concentration of programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption in countries with more freedom reflects good practice. Political will is a key determinant of program effectiveness in anti-corruption, and is more likely to be constrained, partial or sham in countries that are categorized as not free. Similarly, civic engagement is an important factor in anti-corruption effectiveness and is highly constrained in countries that are not free. Freedom is critical for transparency, oversight and checks and balances to have their intended effect on curbing corruption.

The Djibouti Anticorruption Program (DACP) referenced above serves as a good illustration of this point. The DACP fostered checks and balances in government through support to parliament and an executive branch oversight institution, but faced challenges with both partners. Parliament was not well positioned to serve as a check on the executive as opposition parties had boycotted the 2008 parliamentary election,[14] and a lack of political will in the initial partner oversight institution, the Chambres des Comptes et Discipline Budgetaire, led to its replacement by a sister agency, the Office of the Inspector General.[15] The program met its targets, but the research team questions its overall impact on corruption given the restrictive context that allowed limited checks and balances.

By contrast, programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption are more likely to meet with sufficient political will and civic engagement in countries categorized as free or partly free. Political freedoms enable a de-concentration of power that allows different branches of government to operate independently, political oppositions to challenge incumbents, and citizens to hold government officials accountable through elections or pressure.

For the period this research examined, the share of programs with a primary focus versus those with a secondary focus on anti-corruption is similar for countries categorized as free and partly free. Indeed, programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption represent 40% of programs in countries categorized as free and 35% in countries categorized as partly free. While they are more likely to be effective in countries that are categorized as free, these programs may have traction in countries that are categorized as partly free, depending on the context. A number of factors can influence a Mission's decision to support programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption, including the concurrence or possibility of Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) programming and the host government's interest, often to complement its own anti-corruption agenda. The Government of Benin, for example, showed genuine interest in the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative, which funded its national anti-corruption authority and a coalition of anti-corruption CSOs, because the MCC Compact was not renewed and it hoped to qualify for additional MCC funding.[16]

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[13] Freedom House categories were stable in Sub-Saharan Africa over this period. Only 3 countries moved between categories: Mauritania moved from partly free to not free in 2009, and Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire moved from not free to partly free in 2011 and 2013, respectively. These movements do not affect the calculations.
[14] Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2018, Djibouti. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/djibouti.
[15] USAID. 2010. *Djibouti Anti-Corruption Program (DACP): Final Performance Report, October 15, 2008 – March 31, 2010*, Management Systems International. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ980.pdf.
[16] Authors' interview with USAID Africa Bureau staff. June 4, 2018.

Sectoral Programming

For this period, USAID anti-corruption programming in sub-Saharan Africa has occurred more often in the civil society, local governance and rule of law sub-sectors and less often in non-DRG sectors such as economic growth, natural resource management and health (see Figure 3[17]). Anti-corruption interventions occurred even less often in such sectors as education, agriculture, and water and sanitation.[18]

Figure 3. Sectoral evolution of programs, 2008 – 2018.

SECTORS OVER TIME

- Local Government
- Civil Society/Media
- Public Administration
- Economic Growth
- Public Financial Management
- Natural Resource Management
- Rule of Law
- Institutions of Accountability
- Legislative Strengthening
- Health

One trend shown in the graph is the increase in anti-corruption programs supporting civil society. Since 2012, the greatest number of programs have been in this area, and were 39 percent of all programs in

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[17] Some programs fall into more than one sector so a single program may be counted more than once in this figure.

[18] This review identified only two references to anti-corruption work in the education sector, and none in the agriculture or water and sanitation sectors. Of the former, one reference was a civil society program in Liberia, the Liberian Accountability and Voice Initiative (LAVI), which collaborated with the Mission's Education Team to create an advocacy campaign around increasing the government's education budget and fully implementing the education act. The other was a local governance program in Mali, the Programme de Gouvernance Partagée 2 (PGP2), which supported local education commissions in verifying teacher data, tracking teacher attendance and paying teacher salaries.

2018. Another notable trend line is the decrease in public administration programs from 7 programs in a given year to only 2 programs in 2018.

Supply and Demand

Most of the increase in civil-society programming observed in Figure 3 is due to a rise in stand-alone civil society programming with an anti-corruption focus. As seen in Figure 4, this demand-side (working with civil society) programming increased from 0 to 5 programs or more in a year since 2012. Civil society programming that was paired with initiatives focused on government institutions—combining demand- and supply-side (working with government) approaches—showed some movement during the period, but ended where it started at 13 programs in a year. The number of supply-side programs rose from 8 to 13 before dropping to 5 programs in 2018.

Figure 4. Evolution of supply- and demand-side programming, 2008-2018.

SUPPLY AND DEMAND OVER TIME

Funding

Funding data were available for 67 out of 90 programs.[19] For these 67 programs, funding totaled $1.298 billion over the course of 10 years. Programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption accounted for $247 million and those with a secondary focus on anti-corruption accounted for four times that figure, or $1.050 billion. Funding for programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption was more concentrated in certain Missions, such as Liberia, Zambia and Mali as seen in Figure 5. For programs with a secondary focus on anti-corruption, it was not possible to break out the funding amounts for anti-corruption activities within the larger programs.

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[19] The funding values were compiled from program evaluations and final reports as well as USAID funding data on https://foreignassistance.gov.

Figure 5. Total primary anti-corruption funding by country, 2008-2018.

8. Effectiveness of USAID Anti-Corruption Programming in Sub-Saharan Africa

The authors aimed to understand key determinants of program success and failure in this review of anti-corruption programming. An important source of this analysis was evaluations conducted by independent researchers. Across the 90 programs included in this review, the team found 18 final evaluations and 13 mid-term evaluations. The team supplemented the evaluations with final reports, annual reports and other program documents, in addition to interviews with USAID staff, who designed, managed or advised the programs.

Across the evaluations, program documents and interviews, one factor emerged most prominently as a key determinant of program success or failure: *political will*. Strong political will to implement anti-corruption reforms among political leaders could catalyze efforts within government and civil society to advance reform, whereas weak or absent political will could stall them.

Strong political will has not been common in the region, but a few reformers took office and advanced the anti-corruption agenda in their country in this period:

- In Côte d'Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara took office in 2010 after campaigning on a good governance platform. An economist who had worked for the International Monetary Fund and the Central Bank of West African States, he was keen to see his country's progress on international rankings, and supported a number of reforms.[20] USAID/Côte d'Ivoire was able to capitalize on this political will to some extent in its Justice Sector Strengthening Program, which supported the General Inspectorate of Judiciary Services and introduced court fees posters,[21] and intends to address corruption at large in its upcoming accountability activity slated to begin in mid-2018.[22]

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[20] Authors' interview with former USAID Africa Bureau staff. June 4, 2018.
[21] USAID. 2017. *Côte D'Ivoire Justice Sector Strengthening Program: Midterm Performance Evaluation.* Democracy International.
[22] As reported on USAID/Côte d'Ivoire's website: https://www.usaid.gov/cote-divoire/democracy-human-rights-and-governance.

- In Senegal, Macky Sall assumed the presidency in 2012 and championed anti-corruption efforts, including his country's membership in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), innovations within the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which USAID/Senegal supported, and agreement to serve as lead African nation in the USG Partnership on Illicit Finance in 2015.[23]
- In Ghana, President Nana Akufo-Addo has assumed a similar stance since taking office in 2017, and has reached out to civil society organizations for guidance on the fight against corruption and appointed a very vocal person to head the Office of the Special Prosecutor.[24]

As seen in Table 1, the World Bank's Control of Corruption scores have improved during Ouattara and Sall's years in office, from -1.16 to -.54 in Côte d'Ivoire and from -.26 to -.03 in Senegal. It is likely that their initiatives, with the support of the international community, have resulted in these improved scores. While Control of Corruption scores only extend to 2016 at the time of this writing, the authors would expect Ghana's scores to improve for the years he has been in office. However, it is important to note that there are no guarantees of sustained political will for anti-corruption reform as incentives shift for political leaders. The last year or two has witnessed declines in several areas related to anti-corruption in both Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal.[25]

In this period, political transitions also ushered in presidents who weakened the anti-corruption impetus in their country. In Tanzania, the 2015 election of John Magufuli led to reversals on a number of anti-corruption initiatives despite stepped up rhetoric and attacks on allegedly corrupt officials: his administration withdrew Tanzania's membership in OGP, has discouraged donor programs in this area, and has restricted the ability of the opposition, media and civil society to hold the government to account.[26] His focus on punishing rather than preventing corruption suggests his motives may lie more with purging opponents than fostering accountability. In Liberia, the 2018 election of President Weah raised hopes that he will be able to tackle corruption given his relatively untainted reputation as well as his public pronouncements against graft and nepotism. However, some have criticized a number of his governmental appointments, including his decision to nominate the heads of the Liberia Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative and the Internal Audit Agency, which are critical integrity institutions. Civil society argues that the direct presidential appointments run contrary to the recruitment and vetting processes required by the agencies' acts and undermine their independence.[27]

Even with political will at top levels of government, successful programs need to locate political will within partner institutions. For example, an evaluation of the Zambia Threshold Program (ZTP) concluded, "It should not be assumed that leaders at the highest levels of government can push reforms through a bureaucracy without the cooperation of reformers at operational levels. The ZTP demonstrated that champions of reform at both levels, and in particular among upper management within the institution, were needed to accomplish outcomes."[28] Similarly in Liberia, the Governance and Economic Management Support (GEMS) program worked across 15 ministries and agencies and only made progress where it found both political appointees and technical staff with political will in an institution.[29]

The research team encountered numerous examples of programs that performed well or not due to the *strength of the government partner*. For example, support to the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission under the Legal Professional Development and Anti-Corruption (LPAC) program was

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[23] Authors' interview with USAID/Washington staff. June 4, 2018.
[24] Authors' interview with USAID/Ghana staff. May 31, 2018.
[25] Authors' correspondence with USAID Bureau for Africa staff, July 24, 2018.
[26] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania staff. June 5, 2018.
[27] Authors' email correspondence with USAID/Liberia staff. June 13, 2018.
[28] Millennium Challenge Corporation. 2014. *Zambia Threshold Program End-Term Evaluation: Final Report.* Erin Weiser and Rema Balasundaram. https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/index.php/catalog/72/study-description.
[29] Authors' interview with former USAID/Liberia staff. June 1, 2018.

Table 1. Countries by Freedom House ranking, Control of Corruption score and number of USAID projects.

Country Name / # projects per year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Difference 2008-2016
Freedom House Ranking - Free										
Benin	-0.50	-0.62	-0.66	-0.59	-0.86	-0.74	-0.67	-0.56	-0.48	0.02
Projects	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	
Ghana	-0.07	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.13	-0.10	-0.19	-0.20	-0.17	-0.10
Projects	0	0	1	1	1	1	4	4	3	
Senegal	-0.50	-0.49	-0.64	-0.50	-0.26	-0.19	0.06	0.06	-0.03	0.47
Projects	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	
Freedom House Ranking - Partly Free										
Cote d'Ivoire	-1.11	-1.10	-1.16	-1.01	-0.83	-0.74	-0.42	-0.43	-0.54	0.57
Projects	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	2	
Guinea	-1.20	-1.08	-1.20	-1.10	-1.04	-1.04	-1.06	-0.99	-0.94	0.26
Projects	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Kenya	-1.06	-1.06	-0.91	-0.95	-1.09	-1.03	-0.93	-1.01	-0.90	0.16
Projects	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	2	1	
Liberia	-0.74	-0.59	-0.56	-0.67	-0.60	-0.71	-0.77	-0.65	-0.71	0.02
Projects	2	3	4	5	4	4	3	4	8	
Madagascar	-0.27	-0.34	-0.43	-0.48	-0.67	-0.75	-0.84	-0.85	-0.90	-0.64
Projects	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Malawi	-0.45	-0.40	-0.49	-0.42	-0.47	-0.61	-0.75	-0.76	-0.75	-0.31
Projects	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Mali	-0.53	-0.67	-0.68	-0.64	-0.83	-0.79	-0.75	-0.69	-0.67	-0.14
Projects	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	
Mozambique	-0.49	-0.44	-0.45	-0.49	-0.57	-0.60	-0.67	-0.75	-0.87	-0.37
Projects	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	
Niger	-0.72	-0.61	-0.66	-0.64	-0.64	-0.61	-0.69	-0.64	-0.64	0.08
Projects	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	
Nigeria	-0.89	-1.03	-1.05	-1.17	-1.17	-1.22	-1.27	-1.08	-1.04	-0.15
Projects	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	
Sierra Leone	-0.97	-0.93	-0.77	-0.84	-0.95	-0.91	-0.94	-0.79	-0.82	0.15
Projects	1	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	
Tanzania	-0.42	-0.45	-0.54	-0.59	-0.76	-0.77	-0.75	-0.68	-0.51	-0.09
Projects	1	1	1	1	1	2	5	6	6	
Uganda	-0.83	-0.90	-0.92	-0.92	-0.99	-1.04	-1.09	-1.05	-1.06	-0.23
Projects	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	
Zambia	-0.39	-0.46	-0.51	-0.40	-0.28	-0.31	-0.34	-0.34	-0.40	-0.01
Projects	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
Freedom House Ranking - Not Free										
Angola	-1.28	-1.40	-1.33	-1.34	-1.27	-1.31	-1.44	-1.39	-1.41	-0.13
Projects	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Burundi	-1.09	-1.13	-1.17	-1.19	-1.45	-1.41	-1.26	-1.24	-1.18	-0.09
Projects	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	
CAR	-1.12	-0.98	-0.93	-0.95	-0.99	-1.09	-1.16	-1.31	-1.28	-0.16
Projects	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
DRC	-1.24	-1.39	-1.44	-1.43	-1.31	-1.32	-1.30	-1.29	-1.33	-0.09
Projects	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	
Djibouti	-0.33	-0.37	-0.40	-0.41	-0.46	-0.54	-0.60	-0.66	-0.65	-0.32
Projects	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Somalia	-1.87	-1.72	-1.74	-1.71	-1.59	-1.58	-1.66	-1.62	-1.69	0.18
Projects	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	
South Sudan	..	..	-0.82	-1.40	-1.28	-1.38	-1.59	-1.69	-1.58	-0.76
Projects	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	
Zimbabwe	-1.36	-1.36	-1.37	-1.40	-1.37	-1.40	-1.39	-1.30	-1.28	0.07
Projects	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	0	

deemed one of the Mission's weakest activities in terms of return on investment since the Commission faces a number of constraints that have limited its ability to fulfill its mandate.[30] By contrast, the final report for Creating an Enabling Policy Environment in Sierra Leone (CEPESL) concluded, "Having a 'policy champion' pushing development of an enabling environment for natural resources management was a critical factor in the success of policy reform effort."[31] Supporting a champion within a specific organization can be effective. As stressed by Mungiu-Pippidi, some of the most successful cases of corruption control have occurred at the level of individual government institutions, which can be small islands of accountability within a context of even rampant corruption.[32]

Other sources lamented their programs' *vulnerability to personnel shifts* in counterpart institutions. In Angola, the replacement in 2008 of the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, who had been championing decentralization and was open to dialogue with civil society, hindered the Municipal Development Program according to the final evaluation.[33] In Mozambique, the G2G grant with the Attorney General's Office lost momentum when the Attorney General, who helped design the program and who had significant political stature and capital, was replaced in 2014.[34] Similarly, a 2007 annual report of the Malawi Government Integrity program noted:

> "While we deal with institutions, the personalities who lead the institutions can have a big impact on project progress…A 'difficult' Dean at the Law School necessitated changing focus of the activity continuously. After changing primary focus to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Secretary to the Ministry passed away. However, now both positions have been filled by new professionals who are interested and committed to fighting corruption and the activity is moving forward."[35]

Program documents and staff generally advised against efforts to build political will from scratch through demand-side efforts, since the impact is often limited when not matched with supply-side support. For example, through the Making All Voices Count initiative, civil society generated a lot of innovations, but

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[30] Authors' interview with former USAID Africa Bureau staff. June 4, 2018.

[31] USAID. 2011. *Creating an Enabling Policy Environment in Sierra Leone: (CEPESL): Final Report.* Tetra Tech ARD. April 2011. https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/GetDoc.axd?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MTczOTYw&pID=NTYw&attchmnt=True&uSesDM=False&rIdx=MTY3MTQ0&rCFU=

[32] Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2015. *The Quest for Good Governance.* Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. See also USAID. 2017. *Combatting Corruption Among Civil Servants* for reference to other studies on institutional-level interventions.

[33] USAID. 2012. *The Municipal Development Program: Final Evaluation Report.* José Jaime Macuane and Alexandra Gamito. March 29, 2012. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACU206.pdf.

[34] Authors' interview with former USAID/Mozambique staff. May 25, 2018. The replacement came at a time when the Attorney General's Office was in the process of prosecuting the theft of $1billion in donor funds (called EMATUM) by the leaders of the government.

[35] USAID. 2007. *Annual Progress Report No. 6 Period covering October 01, 2006 to September 30, 2007 (FY 2007), Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Country Program: Strengthening Government Integrity to Support Malawian Efforts to Roll Back Corruption and Encourage Fiscal Responsibility.* Casals & Associates, Inc. https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/GetDoc.axd?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MTQwNTg3&pID=NTYw&attchmnt=True&uSesDM=False&rIdx=MTM1MTg5&rCFU=.

they were not taken up by governments, since government officials were not engaged as a partner.[36] However, one program, SIAPS, noted success in **bolstering political will** in a counterpart ministry through research establishing evidence of a problem[37] and aligning with the government's broader work plans.[38] These tactics may have worked to generate political will in part because SIAPS focused on wastage and inefficiencies rather than corruption per se.

Many programs instead point to the importance of **pairing supply and demand-side approaches** to buttress political will, where some political will in government already exists. Experience from hundreds of OGP initiatives in dozens of countries has revealed three ingredients that are necessary for success: 1) government reformers with a mandate to advance open government, 2) processes that allow citizens to co-create and monitor OGP commitments, and 3) political will by senior political leaders.[39] The Ghana Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms (GSAM) program has also shown that civil society oversight paired with government audits are more effective than either on their own. Consequently, USAID/Ghana is now considering how to link top-down and bottom-up accountability initiatives and integrate that approach across their technical programs in their new Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS).[40]

As another example, the Responsible Minerals Trade program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) supported a multi-stakeholder group to collect information on mineral supply chains, determine if the supply chains comply with international standards, and recommend specific mine sites for formal government certification as conflict-free. The project benefited from integrating government, civil society and the private sector in the oversight mechanism. By the end of FY 2017, the program had supported the validation of 407 mines in eastern DRC and brought approximately $88 million worth of minerals annually into legal and transparent supply chains.[41] By contrast, in Tanzania under the Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsibility (STAR) program, public expenditure tracking (PETS) committees did not have sufficient leverage to create consequences for their tracking of public funding flows when governmental interest was absent.[42] In other contexts, where government engaged with civil society on findings, PETS have led to a reduction in the leakage of funds from central to local levels.[43]

This tracks with DFID's review of anti-corruption impact evaluation studies, which found that community monitoring only worked when it was linked to punishment, either through elections or government enforcement.[44] Similarly, a study focused on interventions in Africa found that when citizen

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[36] Authors' interview with former USAID/Washington staff. May 23, 2018.
[37] Authors' interview with USAID SIAPS staff. June 11, 2018.
[38] SIAPS program document on Guinea. USAID. 2017. *SIAPS Guinea End of Project Report*. Management Sciences for Health. September 2017. http://siapsprogram.org/publication/altdown/siaps-guinea-end-of-project-report/english.
[39] Authors' interview with former USAID/Washington staff. May 23, 2018.
[40] Authors' interview with USAID/Ghana staff. May 31, 2018.
[41] Authors' interview with USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3) Office of Land and Urban staff. June 19, 2018.
[42] USAID. 2014. *USAID/Tanzania Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, Responsibility (STAR) Program* Performance *Evaluation: Final Report*. Democracy International, Inc. April 2014. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KD5D.pdf.
[43] Gauthier, Bernard. 2013. "Making Leakages Visible: Public Expenditure Tracking in Education," *Global Corruption Report: Education*, Transparency International. NY: Routledge.
[44] See Hanna, R., Bishop, S., Nadel, S., Scheffler, G, Durlacher, K. 2011. *The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy: what has worked, what hasn't, and what we don't know–a systematic review*. Technical report. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. http://blog-pfm.imf.org/files/u4-paper.pdf.

demand and monitoring did have an impact, it was usually because there were also reformers in government wanting change,[45] and a multi-donor study of 90 interventions found that initiatives needed to link citizens' voice and state accountability in order to generate improved governance and development outcomes.[46]

More generally, and especially where political will is questionable or lacking, efforts can focus on *improving systems and eliminating opportunities for corruption*. In many contexts, a frontal assault on corruption is too much of an uphill battle, and seemingly minor efforts such as cutting out middlemen in tax collection or reforming systems at the ports can gnaw away at corruption in a more effective and sustainable way.[47] This was the tack taken by USAID/Kenya in their 2014-2018 CDCS. There was no high-level champion in government for fighting corruption, so they decided to work on corruption through strengthening systems and processes that prevent corruption in new county governments, but without a dedicated anti-corruption program.[48] An evaluation of the Zambia Threshold Program draws a similar conclusion: efforts to simplify processes and improve services in business registration and customs administration had more impact than activities focused on ethics.[49]

Reviews of interventions across many country contexts underscore this point. Less political interventions, such as public financial management, procurement and tax administration reform, consistently performed well, whereas results were mixed or poor for more political interventions such as anti-corruption agencies and civil service reform.[50] Similarly, one-stop shops that streamlined business registration, business licensing, export/import operations, and investor registration largely resulted in reducing opportunities for corruption, although some do not.[51]

In the absence of political will at the national level, efforts can also *focus at the local level*. In DRC, for example, political will at the center of government was weak, but was strong for decentralization at the local level, which the Programme de Bonne Governance project harnessed. The final evaluation emphasized, "Political will is a necessary pre-condition to project investments, including the will to participate in activities; to allocate public resources that support the project goals; and to take decisions that implement reforms. The successful [local government] tax revenue component had all three aspects."[52] In Nigeria, a similar situation prevailed, so the Mission worked with a few governors who wanted to reduce corruption, rather than national institutions.[53] In Tanzania, backsliding after the 2015

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[45] David Booth and Diana Cammack. 2013. *Governance for Development in Africa*.

[46] Alina Rocha Menocal and Bhavna Sharma. 2008. *Joint Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability: Synthesis Report*. London: DFID, 2008.

[47] Authors' interview with former USAID Africa Bureau staff. June 4, 2018.

[48] Authors' interview with former USAID/Kenya staff. May 25, 2018.

[49] Millennium Challenge Corporation. 2014. *Zambia Threshold Program End-Term Evaluation Final Report*. Erin Weiser and Rema Balasundaram. https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/index.php/catalog/72/study-description.

[50] Jesper Johnsøn, Nils Taxell and Dominik Zaum, 2012. "Mapping Evidence Gaps in Anti-corruption: Assessing the State of the Operationally Relevant Evidence on Donors' Actions and Approaches to Reducing Corruption." U4 Issue October 2012, No 7.

[51] USAID. 2015. *Practitioner's Guide for Anticorruption Programming*. Management Systems International. January 2015; and "How many stops in a one-stop shop? A review of recent developments in business registration." IFC (2009): https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/Howmanystopsinaonestopshop.pdf

[52] USAID. 2014. *Final Performance Evaluation: Programme de Bonne Gouvernance (PBG) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Final Performance Evaluation*. International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. August 8, 2014. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K2F6.pdf.

[53] Authors' interview with USAID/Washington staff. June 1, 2018.

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election prompted USAID to revise its approach. Noting political will still existed among local officials, they included anti-corruption components into their work at the local level, without framing them as anti-corruption activities."[54] In addition, across different regions and contexts, the best OGP success stories are at the sub-national level and focused on service delivery.[55]

USAID staff also noted how *multilateral initiatives* and *economic incentives* can work as levers even where political will is weak.[56] In Central African Republic and Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development (PRADD) II program supported the transparency and traceability of conflict diamonds as part of the Kimberly Process, whereas "overtly tackling corruption head on would have been a non-starter."[57] The lever tends to be stronger where standards are more rigorous or when there are complementary economic incentives for reform. Regarding natural resource supply chains, staff suggested that the OECD due diligence guidance and OGP apply more rigorous standards, whereas EITI and the Kimberly Process are less rigorous. For example, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act created a demand for certified conflict-free minerals in line with OECD guidelines and provided a powerful incentive for the DRC government to enact reforms which has led to a drastic reduction in the control of mines by armed groups in eastern DRC: from estimates that almost every mine was under control by armed groups prior to the legislation (and subsequent DRC government reforms), new research suggests that 3 out of 4 miners working in tin, tantalum and tungsten mines—known as the 3Ts—are now free from armed group control.[58]

Reports and staff also pointed to the *complexity of program design* as an impediment to success in a number of programs. An annual report of the Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions (AHADI) program in Kenya noted, "The complexity of the program design which has multiple stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries has affected the ability of the program to provide targeted and focused support in a consistent manner which is an important pre-requisite for ensuring impact."[59] Similarly, a 2017 results report of the Liberia Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project noted that "complex project designs should be avoided in low capacity environments. The fact that the project had five components, 20 subcomponents with a number of activities under each subcomponent had caused problems related with coordination and also dilution of government focus."[60] Program documents also referred to the "over-ambitious program design" of the Zambia Threshold

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[54] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania staff. June 5, 2018.

[55] Authors' interview with former USAID/Washington staff. May 23, 2018.

[56] Authors' interview with USAID/Washington staff. June 4, 2018; and authors' interview with USAID/Washington staff. June 1, 2018.

[57] Authors' interview with USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3) Office of Land and Urban staff. June 19, 2018.

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] USAID. 2016. *Agile and Harmonized Assistance to Devolved Institutions (AHADI) FY 2016 Annual Progress Report, 01 October 2015 – 30 September 2016.* State University of New York/Center for International Development. October 30, 2016. https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/GetDoc.axd?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MjM0ODI3&pID=NTYw&attchmnt=True&uSesDM=False&rIdx=MjI2NzQ2&rCFU=

[60] World Bank. 2017. *Implementation Completion and Results Report.* Liberia Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project. December 18, 2017. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/565131514407008744/pdf/ICR00004277-12182017.pdf.

Project and the "vast scope" of the Programme de Bonne Gouvernance in DRC, which "handicapped" the program.[61]

Short *time frames* also presented a challenge to success. A mid-term evaluation of the four-year Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening (ADISS) program in Ghana stated, "The real threat to the ultimate success of the ADISS activity is time. Instilling a culture of integrity and changing social attitudes and behavior are long term propositions."[62] The final evaluation of the Uganda Threshold Program in 2010 year echoed this sentiment: "Governance and accountability reforms are not one off but require longer-term engagement with institutions."[63]

Program documents and staff also cautioned against the use of *technology* as a panacea. One interviewee stressed, "Technology is not the answer. What counts is the trust and the political will and the agreement that civil society has to work with the government. Take almost any case management system in Africa: they died once the funding stopped because the norms and behaviors never changed."[64] An analysis of seven Making All Voices Count initiatives supported this claim, noting "there are limits to what technology can deliver in terms of augmenting citizen voice and enhancing accountability, particularly in the absence of other offline activities such as engaging citizens in meaningful ways and building good relationships with key government actors and departments."[65] The final evaluation of the Zambia Threshold Program made a similar point: "information technology is likely to be beneficial only as the last step in the reform process, not the first, and should be used to incentivize concrete regulatory or process re-engineering rather than replacing them.[66]

USAID staff have also grappled with the issue of maintaining anti-corruption efforts through political transitions. Drawing from its work across dozens of countries, the Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services Program has tried where possible to *embed reforms in legislation*, which helps to institutionalize and sustain initiatives. A manager of the program explained, "We try to get work underpinned by legislation, which takes time, but it makes it harder to roll back reforms."[67] Embedding reforms in legislation also gives stakeholders opportunity to explain the importance of the

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[61] Millennium Challenge Corporation. 2014. *Zambia Threshold Program End-Term Evaluation Final Report.* Erin Weiser and Rema Balasundaram. https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/index.php/catalog/72/study-description and USAID. 2014. *Final Performance Evaluation: Programme de Bonne Gouvernance (PBG) in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Final Performance Evaluation Final Report, (DRC).* International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. August 8, 2014. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K2F6.pdf.
[62] USAID. 2017. *Mid-term Performance Evaluation of Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening (ADISS) Activity.* The Mitchell Group, Inc. (TMG). September 2017. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00N24F.pdf.
[63] USAID. 2010. *Anti-Corruption Country Threshold Program Evaluation Report: Final.* Centre for Justice Studies and Innovations and The Consulting House. June 18, 2010. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACT059.pdf
[64] Authors' interview with USAID/Washington staff. June 1, 2018.
[65] Hrynick, T and Waldman, L. 2017. "ICT-facilitated accountability and engagement in health systems: a review of Making All Voices Count mHealth for accountability projects." *Making All Voices Count Research Report.* Brighton: The Institute of Development Studies. https://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/ict-facilitated-accountability-and-engagement-in-health-systems-a-review-of-making-all-voices-count-mhealth-for-accountability-projects.
[66] Millennium Challenge Corporation. 2014. *Zambia Threshold Program End-Term Evaluation: Final Report.* Erin Weiser and Rema Balasundaram. https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/index.php/catalog/72/study-description.
[67] Authors' interview with USAID SIAPS staff. June 11, 2018.

reforms to newly elected officials who may have different priorities from their predecessors.[68] Although passage of laws does not guarantee their implementation, they provide a foothold for reform.

USAID staff also noted the limitations of **multi-donor trust funds**. In Liberia, for example, staff explained that they participated in the multi-donor trust fund supporting public financial management in order to get a seat at the table. If USAID had not contributed financially to the trust fund, its technical opinions and expertise may not have been taken into account.[69] However, contributing to the multi-donor trust fund afforded USAID staff less involvement in the management and oversight of the award..[70] Similarly, staff from USAID/Tanzania explained that they do not contribute to the multi-donor trust fund on public financial management because direct funding to implementing partners is more effective, giving USAID more control and oversight and providing more precision in terms of monitoring and evaluation.[71] High security costs steer USAID away from bilateral programs and toward multi-partner work in Somalia, but staff help shape the projects and provide a near-constant stream of technical assistance even when they make modest investments compared to other donors.[72]

Staff also confirmed the benefits of **donor coordination** and **diplomatic engagement**. Where anti-corruption programming is more robust, donors have tended to convene working groups to share information. In Ghana, for example, large investments from the EU and DFID have spurred creation of a donor anti-corruption working group that meets almost every month and is co-chaired by the Political Section in the US Embassy. The donors have drafted collective letters to advocate for passage of relevant legislation. Mission staff noted, "It helps that Ambassador Jackson is very proactive on these issues."[73] In Liberia, the Swedish Ambassador took the diplomatic lead for advocacy on anti-corruption initiatives.[74]

Finally, a few program documents noted the influence of **project personnel** on program effectiveness. The final evaluation of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in Liberia identified program staff as key determinants of success: "Many of the GEMAP advisors were exceptional professionals in technical areas of financial control, who worked under difficult circumstances, and deserve credit for the success of the program."[75] Similarly, the mid-term evaluation of the Core Institutional Structures Program in South Sudan pointed to the key role of program staff. In this case, the evaluation suggested that one chief of party, who forged a close partnership with the Government of South Sudan and USAID, was more effective than his successor, who focused on internal management of the program and had only periodic interaction with partners.[76] USAID staff with knowledge of the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development (PRADD) program in the

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[68] USAID. 2018. *Strengthening Governance in Pharmaceutical Systems: A Compendium of Country Case Studies.* Walkowiak H, Hafner T, Putter S.J. Submitted to the US Agency for International Development by the Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services (SIAPS) Program. Arlington, VA: Management Sciences for Health.
[69] Authors' interview with former USAID/Liberia staff. June 1, 2018.
[70] Authors' interview with USAID/Liberia staff. June 14, 2018.
[71] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania staff. June 5, 2018.
[72] Authors' email correspondence with former USAID/Washington staff, July 11, 2018.
[73] Authors' interview with USAID/Ghana staff. May 31, 2018.
[74] Authors' interview with former USAID/Liberia staff. June 1, 2018.
[75] USAID. 2010. *Final Evaluation of USAID GEMAP Activities (Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program).* Sibley International LLC. June 2010. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR798.pdf
[76] USAID. 2010. *Mid-term Evaluation of USAID Support to Developing Core Institutional Structures Project: Core Institutions Program.* Management Systems International. January 2010.

Central African Republic (CAR) observed, "It also comes down to the quality and type of people implementing the project. In a way, not having an international COP in CAR has probably helped" given the importance of knowing the country and being adept at local diplomacy, which are qualities possessed by the local COP.[77]

9. Best Approaches to Integrating Anti-Corruption in Sectoral Programs

Much of USAID's programming incorporates elements of good governance such as inclusion, participation, and accountability because it enhances development outcomes. Indeed, integrating governance is promoted by the DRG strategy's Development Objective 4, "Improve development outcomes through the integration of DRG principles and practices across USAID's development portfolio." This review examined a number of approaches to integrating anti-corruption in sectoral programs.

Governance component of sectoral program

One approach included governance as a component of a sectoral program, of which the Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services (SIAPS) Program provided a clear example. Operating in 22 countries (10 in sub-Saharan Africa), SIAPS strengthened the management and rational use of essential medicines and health supplies so that more people could access the health care they needed. Strengthened governance was one of five intermediate results for the program.[78]

A report on SIAPS' work concluded that targeting "inefficiencies" (rather than "corruption") was often a politically acceptable starting point for governance interventions given possible sensitivities and resistance. If reformers presented compelling evidence of inefficiencies, they could "help convince policy makers and stakeholders of the political and financial benefits of addressing governance issues that contribute to such problems." Furthermore, the SIAPS report noted that consultative processes could help diverse stakeholders reach mutual understanding. Such consultative processes included holding meetings that enabled stakeholders to voice concerns and provide feedback, sharing draft bills for comment and allowing observers to sit in on decision-making meetings.[79]

Anti-corruption component of sectoral program

This review also examined programs in other sectors that included an anti-corruption component. For example, USAID has supported Wildlife Crime Units in Mozambique and DRC that promote interagency cooperation in each country, which also increases the checks and balances among wildlife, law enforcement and customs officials. The Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) has also supported the Eagle Network to reduce wildlife trafficking by increasing the capacity

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[77] Authors' interview with USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3) Office of Land and Urban staff. June 19, 2018.
[78] The other intermediate results of SIAPS were: capacity for pharmaceutical supply management and services increased and enhanced; information for decision-making challenge in the pharmaceutical sector addressed; financing strategies and mechanisms strengthened to improve access to medicines; and pharmaceutical services improved to achieve desired health outcomes.
[79] USAID. 2018. *Strengthening Governance in Pharmaceutical Systems: A Compendium of Country Case Studies.* Walkowiak H, Hafner T, Putter SJ. Submitted to the US Agency for International Development by the Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services (SIAPS) Program. Arlington, VA: Management Sciences for Health.

of media and civil society to report crime and encourage governments to take efforts to reduce it. E3 staff noted that in some cases they talk about combating crime rather than corruption, as a focus on corruption can cause problems.[80]

Multi-sector governance program

Another approach to integrating anti-corruption in sectoral programs entailed a stand-alone governance effort across multiple sectors. The Public Sector System Strengthening (PS3) activity in Tanzania represents a strong example of this approach. PS3 is working with local governments to improve service delivery. It strengthens systems that are not sector specific, such as planning, budgeting and expenditure reporting. It has made funding visible from the national level down to the facility level, which has reduced opportunities for corruption. Using health and other sectoral (but largely not DRG) funds, it contributes to the Mission's work in health, education, agriculture, water, rural road infrastructure and local government.[81]

PS3 works only with the public sector; it does not work with CSOs, which was a decision the Mission made to secure the trust of government. The program has used a non-controversial focus on service delivery and has spent a significant amount of time building relationships with the government. Politically, the ruling party has supported PS3 since it helps them demonstrate that they can deliver services.[82] The program is considered a notable success, and has great support from all levels of government.[83]

A variant on the stand-alone governance effort across multiple sectors was the Capacity Development for Partners of Accountability Program (referred to as "Pamoja Twajenga"). USAID/Tanzania awarded three direct grants to institutions of accountability (Ethics Secretariat, National Audit Office of Tanzania, and Public Procurement Regulatory Authority) and five direct grants to CSOs from different sectors to support accountable governance through dialogues and analysis of public expenditures. While Mission staff affirmed that having a mechanism which engaged both sides (government and civil society) was "optimal," they also regarded the direct funding of government institutions as overly ambitious since the government did not have experience with receiving USG money directly and it entailed significant management time.[84]

10.   Conclusions

On programming patterns

This review of USAID anti-corruption programming in sub-Saharan Africa has revealed trends in the levels and areas of focus over the past decade. Anti-corruption programming has been somewhat stable over the period, although it experienced a notable uptick between 2014 and 2017, followed by a drop in 2018. The drop likely reflects the decrease in DRG funding for the region. Anti-corruption programming occurs more often in the civil society, local governance and rule of law sub-sectors and less often in non-DRG sectors such as economic growth, natural resource management and health. The majority of anti-corruption programs combine demand- and supply-side approaches, although the period

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[80] Authors' interview with USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3) Office of Forest and Biodiversity staff. June 11, 2018.
[81] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania Public Sector Systems Strengthening staff. June 14, 2018.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania staff. June 5, 2018.
[84] *Ibid.*

witnessed a steady increase in demand-side programs. Programs with a primary focus on anti-corruption represent less than a fourth of all anti-corruption related programs in a given year, but are concentrated in countries with more political and civic freedom.

On political will

In countries where USAID had a clear understanding of the level of political will within the government, programs were better targeted. USAID's programs in Tanzania provide a good example of how a Mission can identify ways to promote anti-corruption in closing political space by focusing on sectors that align with the objectives of the government. In Tanzania, islands of political will existed at the local level and were focused on service delivery.[85] In Liberia, USAID initially overestimated some government partners' ability and willingness to tackle key reforms. However, their current LAVI program is identifying programming sectors as opportunities emerge. Moreover, the Mission is aiming to draft a more flexible CDCS with programming options for different levels of government engagement. This could mean a program starts working with one government agency and then switches to working with a different subset of the government or on the demand side, for example, if the agency is not a willing partner.[86]

On explicitly targeting anti-corruption

By and large, USAID's programming with a primary focus on anti-corruption occurred in countries categorized as free or partly free by Freedom House. These countries also tended to have higher scores on the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator. These countries allowed donors to be more open about addressing corruption and the programs worked across government, civil society, and the private sector. In Senegal, for example, the Mission had the political space to work with the government to enter into the EITI. In Benin, the Mission supported the government's efforts to address corruption in the pharmaceuticals sector through convening inter-agency meetings, helping to draft action plans, and supporting training, technical assistance and awareness raising.[87]

On the importance of stakeholder relationships

Interviews with USAID staff and program documentation consistently highlighted the importance of strong relationships with the host government and other local partners. Where the government point of contact was truly engaged with USAID in guiding the program, initiatives were more locally owned and local partners were more engaged. The Tanzania PS3 program dedicated time to building a strong relationship with the President's Office – Regional Authority for Local Government (PO-RALG), which helped the program work across the government in many sectors.[88]

On integrating anti-corruption into sectoral programs

Efforts to integrate anti-corruption into sectoral programs often adopted less sensitive language and approaches. Targeting "inefficiencies" or "crime" rather than "corruption" could lower resistance to interventions. In addition, multilateral initiatives and economic incentives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, could work as levers even where political will is weak.

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[85] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania staff. June 5, 2018.
[86] Authors' interview with USAID/Liberia staff. June 14, 2018; authors' interview with USAID/Washington staff. June 1, 2018.
[87] Authors' interview with USAID/Benin staff. June 7, 2018.
[88] Authors' interview with USAID/Tanzania Public Sector Systems Strengthening staff. June 14, 2018.

On staff understanding

This review also revealed an understanding of anti-corruption as a cross-cutting issue among USAID staff. In program documents and interviews, the research team observed non-DRG staff embracing the issue and DRG staff looking for impact in other sectors. Staff in the field and in Washington seemed equally aware of the sensitivities and politics of anti-corruption programming in different contexts, and were interested in sharing lessons for this report.

11.   Recommendations

Finally, the review generated a number of recommendations for future anti-corruption programming, which the authors present below:

Strategic

- *Where possible, aim to combine demand- and supply-side approaches in one program*. This review confirms previous research that identifies the linking of voice (demand) and accountability (supply) as a best practice.[89] Linking enables coordination, layering and sequencing of activities that separate awards or one-sided approaches do not. In more restrictive environments, however, linking may not be possible or advised.
- *Avoid implementing stand-alone anti-corruption programs in countries that are categorized as not free*. They are unlikely to gain the space and support to undertake direct actions against corruption and are rather more likely to serve as a political fig leaf for a repressive regime.
- *Where political will is low, consider focusing on public management systems (and public financial management systems, in particular), inefficiencies, or service delivery* at the local level that do not trigger political sensitivities.
- *Work where there are champions* who share anti-corruption goals and are receptive to USAID funding.

Programmatic

- *Consider activities that may bolster political will in a counterpart ministry* through research establishing evidence of a problem, aligning with the government's broader work plans, and supporting consultative processes.
- *Ensure that time is dedicated in project design and implementation to developing a true relationship with local stakeholders*. This should not be sacrificed for the sake of generating quick wins. This is especially important when working with the host government.
- If possible, *aim to design flexibility into programming to take advantage of reformers* coming into office or to pivot where government partners are not supportive.
- *Take advantage of multilateral initiatives* such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Open Government Partnership, where applicable, to bolster political will and increase the likelihood of program success.
- *Support donor coordination and diplomatic engagement on anti-corruption issue*s to bolster political will and support anti-corruption programming.

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[89] In particular, see USAID. 2015. *Practitioner's Guide for Anticorruption Programming*. Washington, DC: Management Systems International.
https://www.usaid.gov/opengov/developer/datasets/Practitioner's_Guide_for_Anticorruption_Programming_2015.pdf.

- *Carefully assess the pros and cons of investing in multi-donor trust funds*, such as for public sector modernization or public financial management. These typically operate with less USAID control and oversight but allow for coordinated donor responses and pressure points.

Design

- *Avoid overly complex or ambitious program designs* especially in low capacity environments.
- *Set realistic targets and strive for longer time frames*, recognizing that changing social attitudes and behavior are long-term propositions.
- *Use information technology to buttress and incentivize regulatory reform* or process re-engineering rather than replacing them.
- Where possible, *embed reforms in legislation or rules*, which helps to institutionalize and sustain initiatives.
- *Improve archiving of program documents and measuring program results to support learning agendas.* Even among evaluations and final reports, the research team found uneven reference to program indicators.

12.   Annexes

Annex 1: Scope of Work

Purpose: To review and analyze the effectiveness of USAID programming in meeting anti-corruption goals in sub-Saharan Africa and to assess any association between these programs with overall levels of corruption. The research will ultimately serve as a foundation for informing future anti-corruption program design and implementation.

Context

As corruption continues to be a major impediment to development progress, fighting it has been a priority focus of development work for decades. Current USAID policy places a premium on empowering countries receiving assistance to transition to independent stewardship of their own future development. Administrative and grand corruption, however, undermines countries' progress toward self-reliance. The diversion of national revenues to corrupt individuals, for example, saps resources and necessitates greater international support. State capture distorts nations' priorities away from public interests, and lower-level administrative corruption discourages civic participation and burdens the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of society.

USAID has identified anti-corruption as a key cross-cutting priority, and has produced valuable practical tools for field assessments of corruption, frameworks for planning effective anti-corruption programs, and a corresponding training course. There are ample opportunities to apply and evaluate those tools in a region in dire need of strong anti-corruption programming. However, prior broad reviews of USAID programming have found that corruption has been directly addressed only sporadically in assistance programs and without a consistent approach. Improving and expanding the Agency's anti-corruption work in sub-Saharan Africa first requires a thorough and systematic accounting of past and ongoing programming related to the sector.

There have been high-level reviews of USAID's corruption-related work, but there remains a significant knowledge gap regarding anti-corruption work in Africa. A comprehensive review and analysis of this work in sub-Saharan Africa over time, to catalogue previous successes and failures and advance technical knowledge in this area, will allow USAID to more effectively design and implement programming in the region.

Objective

The goal of this research effort is to maximize the impact of future USAID investments in anti-corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. For this, it is necessary to conduct a stocktaking of programming and its effectiveness, which will inform further research and improve interventions. The primary objective is to catalogue USAID programming and results in improving transparency and accountability or to combat corruption over the past decade. The secondary objective is to evaluate what correlation, if any, can be observed between USAID programming in sub-Saharan Africa and levels of grand and administrative corruption in target areas.

The contractor will review programming in Africa that fits a specified definition of anti-corruption programming, developed in conjunction with USAID and the contractor, [90] and will rely mainly on

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[90] USAID anti-corruption programming aims to reduce opportunities and incentives for corruption through public sector reform and deregulation, support for oversight and watchdog activities, and education of citizens about their roles in preventing corruption (source: USAID Anticorruption Strategy, January 2005).

materials in USAID databases and others made available by the Africa Bureau and Missions. This review will focus on programming in the democracy, rights, and governance sector, but may extend into multi-sectoral analysis, where other sectors have had an explicit anti-corruption objective.

The contractor will then analyze available materials, including project documentation, evaluations, results reporting, and other donor reports and contextual information such as data trends, to offer conclusions about the effectiveness of USAID's anti-corruption approaches in Africa. The review will also include consideration of anti-corruption efforts by other USG agencies and donors as a means to providing context of the overall development environment and impact on reducing corruption. It is anticipated that this initial review and analysis will lead to more in-depth research on targeted topics and inform anti-corruption programming.

USAID Investments

Nearly every USAID policy and strategy emphasizes corruption as a major impediment to development progress as it inhibits growth, fuels instability and erodes confidence in government and society. The Africa Regional Strategy points to increasing the accountability of African institutions as an important aspect of strengthening institutional capacity. The 2017 US National Security Strategy points to corruption as a major impediment to Africa's economic growth and commits to promoting effective governance and accountable institutions as a priority action.

To help accomplish this goal, USAID has addressed corruption in its many forms both directly and indirectly through programming to strengthen anti-corruption agencies and campaigns, improve transparency and accountability of institutions of governance at national and subnational levels, strengthen justice systems, raise awareness of the costs of corruption, and support civil society to advance advocacy and act as watchdogs. Today, Missions in Africa are also taking advantage of the growing popular demand for greater transparency and accountability from governments.

USAID Africa Bureau has supported this work, for example in Benin where the Mission is addressing underlying governance issues that foster transnational organized crime. Region-wide efforts have included the Leadership Initiative for Good Governance in Africa program and the decade-long Les Aspin Anti-corruption and Good Governance in Africa program.

Tasks

The contractor will perform a systematic review and analysis of the relevant program documentation and data in order to catalogue USAID anti-corruption efforts in Africa and to evaluate the efficiency of programming. The review will synthesize the types of programming undertaken, identify results and the indicators used to measure results, and note successes, failures and trends in programming over time. The final report will provide conclusions about the overall impact of the technical approaches employed to address corruption directly or indirectly through development programming.

The specific tasks are:

1. Prepare an inventory of anti-corruption related programs undertaken in sub-Saharan Africa over the past ten years.[91]

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[91] This list may build on the database in "Analysis Of USAID Anticorruption Programming Worldwide (2007 - 2013)" at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00k4k6.pdf

2. Review and analyze the documentation associated with these programs, and develop a methodology for determining effectiveness.
3. Prepare a synthesis of the findings from the analysis based on the above methodology.
4. Provide a summary of lessons learned/best practices that help target and improve anti-corruption programming in Africa.

As noted above, the contractor will consult non-USAID materials to the extent that other donor efforts provide context/comparators for the overall effectiveness of anti-corruption programming in specific African countries. Key informant interviews with USAID Africa Bureau, Missions, practitioners, academic experts and other donors may be conducted to supplement and contextualize the analysis.

Deliverables

1. Workplan that outlines specific steps to be taken in the conduct of the research, with projected timeline.
2. Final Report of no more than 30 pages, excluding annexes, provided in MS Word and PDF format, to include:
    - Executive Summary of no more than four pages.
    - Literature Review of documentation as noted in the Objective section.
    - Description of the methodology used to conduct the analysis of program effectiveness.
    - Analysis and findings on program effectiveness.
    - Summary of lessons learned and best practices in anti-corruption programming in Africa.
    - Recommendations for additional research, analysis, data collection or pilot programming.
3. Annexes containing inventory of programming, transcripts of key informant interviews, maps, infographics, and other relevant materials.
4. Two-page briefer for wide audience including USAID, other USG, practitioners and experts.
5. Delivery of two hour-long presentation of analysis, findings and recommendations, and accompanying slides in MS PowerPoint.
6. Visuals in large-sized PNG format (400 KB minimum). All visuals (charts, infographics, maps, etc.) created for the report or other deliverables will be provided to USAID as stand-alone deliverables. Charts should adhere to the data visualization checklist (attached) and should utilize the USAID colors.

Deadline for Deliverables:

- Workplan: April 9, 2018
- Draft Report: May 25, 2018
- Draft Presentation of Preliminary Findings: June 18, 2018
- In-Person Presentation on Preliminary Findings: June 29, 2018
- Second Draft of Final Report: July 13, 2018
- Final Report, Briefer, and Presentation: August 3, 2018
- Final In-Person Presentation: Date TBD in August/September 2018

All deliverables will go through an iterative process responding to USAID's review and feedback.

These deadlines are notional with the exception of the In-Person Presentation on Preliminary Findings. The contractor should submit a proposed timeline with deadlines in the work plan that allows sufficient time for USAID to review deliverables. If the timeline varies substantially, the contractor should provide an explanation.

Level of Effort

One Senior Researcher/Technical Expert will guide efforts and oversee the quality of work and deliverables. One Mid-Level Researcher will provide support to the Senior Researcher. One Mid-Level Communications Specialist will provide assistance to ensure high-quality communications products (briefer, presentation, and all data visuals). The estimated maximum LOE will be 90 days. We anticipate 40 days of work each for the Senior Researcher and the Mid-Level Researcher and 10 days of work for the Communications Specialist. Work must be completed by June 8, 2018.

Qualifications of Senior Researcher/Technical Expert

- Experienced international development researcher, with a doctoral degree in a social science or related field preferred.
- Experience in the design, implementation and/or evaluation of democracy, human rights and governance programming, with technical expertise in the area of corruption.
- A minimum of ten years of prior experience working on democracy, human rights and governance (or related development field) in Africa.
- Excellent writing skills.

Qualifications of Mid-Level Researcher

- Academic or research experience in democracy, human rights and governance, with a master's degree in a social science or related field preferred.
- A minimum of five years of prior work experience in international development or a related field.
- Experience in programming or research related to corruption preferred.
- Excellent writing skills.

Qualifications of Mid-Level Communications Specialist

- Excellent writing and editing skills.
- Strong graphic design and visualization skills.
- Required proficiency with MS Office Suite (Word, Excel, Publisher and PowerPoint) or Adobe Illustrator products.
- A minimum of five-years prior work experience translating complex, technical information for broad audiences.
- Experience working in the field of international development preferred.

This Level of Effort is notional. The contractor should submit a detailed level of effort and provide explanation.

Annex 2: Program Inventory

Country	Program Name
Angola	Municipal Development Program (MDP)
Benin	West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative
Burundi	Policy Reform Program
CAR	Artisanal Mining and Property Rights (AMPR)
Côte d'Ivoire	Justice Sector Strengthening Program
	Legislative Strengthening Program
	Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development (PRADD)
DRC	Responsible Minerals Trade (RMT)
	Building Recovery and Democratic Governance to Advance and Consolidate the DRC Transition Program (BRDG ACT Program)
	ProJustice
	Programme de Bonne Gouvernance
Djibouti	Djibouti Anticorruption Program (DACP)
Ghana	Accountable Democratic Institutions Systems Strengthening (ADISS)
	Ghana Supporting Accountability Mechanisms (GSAMs)
	Ghana Local Governance and Decentralization Program (LOGODEP)
	Resiliency in Northern Ghana (RING)
Guinea	Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development (PRADD)
Kenya	Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability
	Securing Rights to Land & Natural Resources for Biodiversity and Livelihood in the North Coast
	Agile and Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions (AHADI) Activity
	Kenya Reforming the Public Procurement System (Phase I)
	Kenya Reforming the Public Procurement System (Phase II)
	Parliamentary Strengthening Program to the National Assembly of Kenya
Liberia	Liberia Accountability and Voice Initiative (LAVI)
	Legal Professional Development and Anti-Corruption Program
	Local Empowerment for Government Inclusion and Transparency (LEGIT)
	Revenue Generation for Governance and Growth (RG3)
	Access to Justice Project
	Public Sector Modernization Multi-Donor Trust Fund
	Governance and Economic Management Support (GEMS)
	Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (IPFMRP) Mutli-donor Trust Fund
	Civil Society and Media Leadership Project
	Access to Justice and Information Project
	Land Rights and Community Forestry Program (LRCFP)
	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)
Madagascar	Madagascar Anti-Corruption Initiative Program
Malawi	Strengthening Government Integrity in Malawi Project
	Local Government Accountability and Performance
Mali	Mali Justice Project

Country	Program Name
	Mali Sub-National Governance Project
	Mali Civic Engagement Program
	Mali PGP2 - Support to Local Governance and Decentralization
Mozambique	Parceria Cívica para Boa Governação
	Wildlife Crime Prosecution Support Program
	Mozambican Attorney General's Office and the Central Office to Combat Corruption
	Media Strengthening Program
	Making Governance Increasingly Democratic (MGID)
Niger	Niger Increased Transparency and Accountability in the Management of Natural Resources
	Participatory, Responsive Governance (PRG)
Nigeria	Strengthening Advocacy and Civic Engagement
	Restructured Economic Framework for Openness, Reform and Macroeconomic Stability
	Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (LEAD)
	Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI)
	Anti-corruption program with the National Assembly
Senegal	Governance for Local Development (GOLD)
	Program for Governance and Peace in Senegal
	Wula Nafaa
Sierra Leone	Creating an Enabling Policy Environment in Sierra Leone (CEPESL)
	Sierra Leone Promoting Agriculture, Governance, and the Environment (PAGE)
Somalia	Strengthening Somali Governance
South Sudan	Strengthening Core Economic Governance Institutions II
	Core Institutional Structures Program
	Economic Growth Project in South Sudan
Tanzania	Public Sector Systems Strengthening (PS3)
	Building Capacity of Tanzanian Partners of Accountability (Pamoja Twajenga)
	Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsibility (STAR)
	G2G with Ethics Secretariat
	G2G with National Audit Office of Tanzania
	G2G with Public Procurement Regulatory Authority
	Citizens Engaged in Government Oversight (CEGO)
	MCC Threshold Support Program
Uganda	Strengthening Decentralization for Sustainability Program
	Governance, Accountability, Participation and Performance Program (GAPP)
	MCC Threshold Anti-corruption Project
Zambia	Fostering Accountability and Transparency (FACT)
	Wildlife Crime Prevention Project (WCPP)
	Zambia Threshold Project (ZTP)
	Zambia Institutional Reform Program
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe Civil Society Strengthening Program
	Strategic Economic Research and Analysis (SERA)
	Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF)

Country	Program Name
Regional and Global Programs	
Making All Voices Count	Leadership in Good Governance in Africa (2 awards)
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	Strengthening Systems to Safeguard Against Misuse of Food Assistance
Partnership on Illicit Finance	Les Aspin Anti-corruption and Good Governance
Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services (SIAPS)	Open Government Partnership

Annex 3: Interview List

Interviewee(s)	Country(ies) or Theme(s) of Interview
Adam Bushey	Global Anti-corruption initiatives, such as Making All Voices Count and Open Government Partnership
Andy Tobiason Barbara Best Mary Rowen Alicia Grimes Heidi Schuttenburg	Natural resources management and biodiversity
Anthony Boni Tobey Busch Nadira Kabir Emmanuel Nfor Helena Walkowiak	Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems and Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services
Brooke Stearns Lawson	Transnational Organized Crime, West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative
Emily Krunic April O'Neill Thomas Kanneh	Liberia
Jennifer Lewis	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Open Government Partnership
Jennifer Horsfall Florida Henjewele	Tanzania
Jeremy Meadows	Liberia, Les Aspin Center , Leadership in Good Governance in Africa, Zimbabwe
Joy Searcie Yaw Akuamoah	Ghana
Kim Thompson Caleb Stephens	Central African Republic Artisanal Mining, Democratic Republic of Congo Artisanal Mining, Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development
Monica Azimi	Kenya
Nina Bowen	Liberia, Somalia
Ricardo Missihoun Simon Asoba Geoffrey Minott	Benin
Shannon Young	Tanzania Public Sector Systems Strengthening
Susan Jay	Mozambique
Victoria Ayer	Open Government Partnership, Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative

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