



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

USAID DG ASSISTANCE IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS

ALLOCATIONS AND IMPACT: 1990-2004

SEPTEMBER 2010

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USAID DG Assistance in Authoritarian Settings Allocations and Impacts: 1990-2004



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INTRODUCTION

This memo shows the results of several analyses requested by MSI concerning the allocation and impact of Democracy and Governance (DG) assistance among authoritarian countries between 1990 and 2004. We were asked specifically to:

1. Ascertain the proportion of DG assistance in authoritarian countries by subsectors (Elections and Political Processes, Rule of Law, Civil Society, and Governance), and by sub-subsectors where relevant (Human Rights within Rule of Law, and Mass Media within Civil Society).
2. Compare the levels of US military assistance with DG assistance in each of the subsectors (and sub-subsectors) for authoritarian countries.
3. Determine the impact of DG allocations in each sub- and sub-subsector on Freedom House (FH) democracy scores in authoritarian countries.
4. Determine the impact of DG assistance in each sub- and sub-subsector on Freedom House score, controlling for the amount of US military assistance allocated to a particular country (and controlling for other relevant variables that may also predict Freedom House scores).

Questions 1 and 2 refer to the *allocation question*, i.e., how USAID has allocated DG assistance in authoritarian countries. We use descriptive statistics such as bar and pie charts to present these results below. Questions 3 and 4 address the *impact question*, i.e., how overall or subsectoral DG assistance may have affected the level of democracy in authoritarian countries. We use econometric models suitable for cross-sectional time-series or panel data to answer these questions.

Our dependent variable in all subsequent analyses is the Freedom House summary measure of the extent of democracy in a country in a given year. Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) provides a rating of the presence of political rights and civil liberties in 192 countries, with scores for the two variables ranging from 1 (highest level of rights and liberties) to 7 (lowest level of rights and liberties). Following the standard procedure, we combined the two scores into a single index of liberal democracy. The variable was rescaled so that a value of “1” represented the *lowest* levels of democracy, and “14” the highest one. Again following standard practices, we consider “authoritarian” those countries that that score between 1 and 4 on the overall Freedom House scale; these are the countries considered “not free” in the Freedom House nomenclature. The dataset we used for the analysis was created for the second phase of the research project “Cross-National Research on USAID’s

Democracy and Governance Programs” (www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html); see Finkel et al. (2007; 2008) for more details.⁸


One final preliminary detail is of importance. The second phase of the project covered the 1990-2004 period, which included the first year following the onset of the Iraq War in March 2003. The democracy and governance allocations to Iraq in 2004 were \$261 million in 2000 dollars, representing nearly one-third of all global USAID DG assistance. Similarly, Iraq received some one-quarter (23%) of all (non-combat) US military assistance in that period as well. Given the unique situation surrounding these allocations, as well as the extremely low Freedom House scores registered for Iraq in that time period, it was decided to introduce a so-called “dummy” or indicator variable for Iraq in 2004 into the analysis as a control for any possible distortions that this case could produce. For the descriptive analyses of Questions 1 and 2, we exclude Iraq 2004 from the bar and pie charts altogether so that a clearer picture of how allocations were generally made in authoritarian settings could be obtained.

Question 1: How has USAID allocated DG assistance for authoritarian countries from 1990 to 2004?


Graph 1.1 shows the overall total allocations for authoritarian, partly free and free countries for the 1990-2004 period (excluding Iraq in 2004). The gross total DG allocation for all authoritarian countries for the 1990-2004 period was \$1586.8 million dollars (in 1990 constant dollars); the corresponding total for “free countries” is \$1338.1 million and for “partly free” countries, the total is \$2871.1 million. Taking into account the total number of countries in the world in each category, we can calculate an “average” allocation for authoritarian countries during the period to be \$2.01 million dollars, larger than the \$1.11 million on average allocated to “free” countries, but less than the \$3.41 million on average allocated to “partly free” countries. This relative ranking of USAID allocations --- from “partly free” to “not free” to “free” – is also seen if we examine only those countries that received *any* USAID DG assistance. These calculations show that the average allocation for USAID DG recipients among “not free” countries was \$4.27 million (in constant 2000 dollars), compared to \$5.45 million for the average “partly free” USAID DG recipient, and \$4.16 million for the average USAID DG recipient among “free” countries.

⁸ The full Freedom House scale is variable “dg02” in the project data set; a trichotomized version of the scale is “dg06”, where a value of “1” represents countries that are “not free” or authoritarian for purposes of these analyses. Appendix A lists all countries that were considered “not free” at some point during the 1990-2004 period.

Graph I.1: Average Democracy and Governance Allocations for “Not Free”, “Partly Free”, and “Free” Countries, 1990-2004 (excluding Iraq in 2004)




Graph I.2: Average Subsectoral DG Allocations for “Not Free”, “Partly Free”, and “Free” Countries, 1990-2004 (excluding Iraq in 2004)



This graph shows the relative average amounts allocated to programs within each USAID DG subsector for authoritarian, “partly free” and “free” countries. The same pattern is present for each of the four subsectors of the USAID DG portfolio as in the overall graph I.1: “partly

free” countries receive the highest average amount per country (using all countries in the world in each category as the denominator), followed by “not free” and then “free” countries. The relative allocations among the four subsectors are similar for all three country types as well, with the largest amounts for Civil Society, followed by Governance, Rule of Law, and Elections and Political Processes.

Graph I.3: DG Subsectoral Allocations for Authoritarian Countries only (in percentages)



This graph shows the percentage of assistance that was allocated to each of the four subsectors of the USAID DG portfolio for all authoritarian countries in the 1990-2004 period. It shows that most of the aid (68.9%) for autocracies was oriented towards Civil Society and Governance programs, followed by Rule of Law and Elections and Political Processes. Within the Civil Society subsector, 10% was allocated to Mass Media programs (resulting in this sub-subsector representing 3.68% of overall DG allocations), and 90% was allocated to non-Mass Media programs (representing 32.75% of the overall DG allocations). Within the Rule of Law subsector, 16.8% was allocated to Human Rights programs (representing 3.1% of overall DG allocations), and 83.2% was allocated to non-Human Rights programming, representing 15.13% of overall DG allocations.

We also examine the *trends* in DG allocations within particular subsectors over time. The following table (Table I.1) shows the total USAID allocation by year, the total allocations in each subsector, and the “average” allocation taking into consideration all authoritarian countries in the world at that time, and then the “average” allocation among those countries that received any USAID DG assistance.

The table shows that DG allocations in authoritarian settings have been steadily increasing over time. The gross amount allocated to these countries has risen from 8.57 million dollars in 1990 to approximately 250 million dollars in 2003 and 2004 (not taking into account the 261 million


allocated exclusively in that year to Iraq). This translates into an “average” increase in the allocation for countries that received any US DG assistance from 1 million dollars in 1990 to over 8 million dollars in 2004. If we consider all “not free” countries in the world, regardless of whether they received US DG assistance or not, this translates into an average allocation of only .15 million in 1990 to nearly 5 million dollars on average in 2004. The table also shows that the number of authoritarian countries that receive *any* US assistance in the DG sector rose from about 10 in the 1990-1991 period to 30 or more in the post-2001 period.

In terms of subsectoral allocations, it can be seen that there have been increases in each of the subsectors over time, though with a significant amount of fluctuations as well. Civil Society allocations quickly became the largest category of assistance among authoritarian countries, though by the late 1990s Governance allocations had more or less reached the same level. Elections and Political Processes and Rule of Law allocations were somewhat smaller throughout the period. Rule of Law allocations were generally larger, though Elections and Political Processes allocations appear to be increasing more rapidly in recent years.

**Table I.1. DG Allocations and Subsectoral Allocations to Authoritarian Countries
Over Time, 1990-2004
(Excluding Iraq 2004, all Figures in Constant 2000 dollars)**

Year	DG	Elections	Rule of Law	Civil Society	Governance	# countries not free	# countries not free that received any DG aid	Avg. DG Assistance per countries receiving DG aid	Avg. DG Assistance per total not free countries in the world
1990	8.57	0.00	1.24	5.98	1.35	58	8	1.071	0.15
1991	19.29	4.90	5.49	8.33	0.56	54	11	1.753	0.36
1992	33.03	5.11	7.06	19.24	1.62	53	18	1.835	0.62
1993	56.43	10.66	15.31	23.39	7.06	57	26	2.170	0.99
1994	42.80	2.90	9.34	21.70	8.86	55	24	1.783	0.78
1995	61.06	2.00	22.75	26.12	10.19	53	23	2.655	1.15
1996	77.65	4.28	31.17	26.11	16.09	53	25	3.106	1.47
1997	100.86	13.06	22.69	37.97	27.14	53	29	3.478	1.90
1998	126.39	10.13	14.19	39.87	62.21	48	25	5.056	2.63
1999	121.45	9.72	19.45	33.48	58.80	49	22	5.520	2.48
2000	136.92	13.88	34.46	47.82	40.76	54	31	4.417	2.54
2001	131.91	11.86	22.07	51.59	46.39	51	30	4.397	2.59
2002	171.01	23.40	21.57	54.67	71.37	51	35	4.886	3.35
2003	258.00	27.40	23.98	95.91	110.71	50	35	7.371	5.16
2004	241.44	65.21	37.72	85.94	52.58	49	29	8.326	4.93

Graph I.4: DG Subsectoral Allocations for Authoritarian Countries per Year (in percentages)



We can see the relative priorities associated with each subsector visually in Graph I.4, which shows the development of DG assistance in terms of the percentages allocated to each subsector allocations over time. The main findings are as follows:

- At the beginning of the period (1990), USAID allocated nearly all of its aid on Civil Society and Governance programs, with very little on the rule of law and none whatsoever on programs in the Elections and Political Processes subsector.
- Between 1991-1993, authoritarian received substantial amounts of aid for Elections and Political Processes programs; from 1994-1996, USAID then reduced the proportion allocated for this type of assistance and increased assistance on Rule of Law and Governance programs.
- The relative amount allocated to the subsectors remained fairly constant between 1997-2003, with the largest categories being Civil Society and Governance.
- 2004 saw a sharp increase in the relative percentage of allocations to Elections and Political Processes, and a sharp decrease in the allocations for Governance.


Question 2: How does USAID Democracy and Governance assistance relate to U.S. military assistance among authoritarian countries between 1990 and 2004?

In order to compare the allocation of USAID Democracy and Governance assistance with U.S. military assistance, we first created a variable that captures whether or not an authoritarian country received any U.S. military assistance in a given year.⁹ Among authoritarian countries, approximately 50% do receive some U.S. military assistance, with the numbers ranging from 19 countries in 1998 to 27 countries in 2004. A comparison of total and average allocations shows clearly that more DG assistance flows to countries that also receive U.S. military assistance: among military assistance recipients (excluding Iraq in 2004), DG allocations totaled \$4919 million for the 1990-2004 period, compared to \$921 million of DG assistance for all countries that did not receive any U.S. military assistance. This translates into a 2.86 million dollar average yearly DG allocation for U.S. military assistance recipients compared to a .8 million dollar average yearly DG allocation for non-U.S. military assistance recipients. Among countries that received *any* DG assistance, countries that also received some U.S. military assistance were allocated \$5.04 million dollars in DG assistance on average, compared to \$3.71 million dollars in DG assistance on average for countries that received no US military assistance. Clearly, there is a positive relationship between receiving U.S. military and receiving U.S. democracy assistance in the period under study: the statistical correlation between the two variables is .14 for all country-years excluding Iraq in 2004, and .26 for all country-years where *some* US DG assistance was allocated.

We can examine these relationships for DG sub and sub-subsectoral allocations as well. The following graphs present these results.


Graph 2.1: Average DG Subsectoral Allocations for Countries Receiving and Not Receiving U.S. Military Assistance, 1990-2004 (excluding Iraq in 2004)

⁹ This was obtained from the variable FPP01, which measures the percentage of U.S. military assistance allocated to a country in a given year. All countries where FPP01 was greater than 0 in a given year were considered as having received some U.S. military assistance.




This graph shows that the allocations for the four DG subsectors differs somewhat for countries that received U.S. military assistance and those that did not. Among countries that received U.S. military assistance, the two largest subsectoral allocations are Governance and Civil Society programs, while Civil Society is by far the largest subsector for countries that did not receive U.S. military assistance, with average allocations that are more than double any of the other three subsectors.

Graph 2.2: Average DG Sub-Subsectoral Allocations for Countries Receiving and Not Receiving U.S. Military Assistance, 1990-2004 (excluding Iraq in 2004)




However, when we examine sub-subsectoral allocations (Graph 2.2), an interesting pattern emerges. Among countries that did not receive any U.S. military assistance, Human Rights and non-Human Rights allocations within the Rule of Law subsector are roughly equal, while among countries receiving U.S. military assistance, nearly all of the Rule of Law allocations are concentrated in non-Human Rights oriented programs. In fact, the average allocation for Human Rights is larger among countries that did not receive U.S. military assistance than among countries that did, despite the much larger overall allocations in the Rule of Law subsector among U.S. military assistance recipients. The pattern for Mass Media allocations within the Civil Society subsector is similar for both U.S. military assistance and no military assistance recipient countries, with the vast majority of allocations being in non-Media programming.

Graph 2.3: DG Subsectoral Allocations, Countries Receiving US Military Assistance (in percentages)



Graph 2.4: DG Subsectoral Allocations, Countries Not Receiving US Military Assistance (in percentages)



Graphs 2.3 and 2.4 show the percentage allocations over time for all DG subsectors for countries that received U.S. military assistance (2.3) and for countries that did not (2.4). For countries receiving military assistance, allocations early in the period are concentrated in Civil Society and Rule of Law, with increasing Governance allocations from about 1996 onwards. For countries not receiving military assistance, there is a steady dominance of Civil Society allocations throughout the period, some increases in Governance allocations in later years, and fluctuating levels of Rule of Law and Elections and Political Processes allocations with little consistent patterns. Further analysis confirms that among countries receiving U.S. military assistance, the dominance of non-Human Rights allocations over Human Rights allocations is present throughout the period; the percentage of Human Rights allocations within the Rule of Law subsector ranges from 0 to 26% in all years since 1993. For countries not receiving U.S. military assistance, the corresponding percentage allocations for Human Rights programs within the Rule of Law subsector ranges from 25% to 50% in 11 of the 12 years since 1993.

Question 3: What is the impact of USAID DG sub- and sub-subsectoral allocations on Freedom House scores among authoritarian countries?

We estimate the impact of USAID DG sub-sectoral and sub-subsectoral allocations in the context of cross-sectional time-series regression models. These models have the relevant USAID DG variables as independent variables and Freedom House scores as

dependent variables, along with “fixed effects” or dummy variables for each country and “fixed effects” or dummy variables for each year to control for factors other than USAID DG allocations that may lead particular countries to be generally more or less democratic (within the authoritarian category), and to control for factors other than USAID DG allocations that cause all countries in a given year to be generally more or less democratic as well. We also model each equation’s error structure to be “first-order autoregressive” to control for unobserved year-to-year factors that may lead a country’s Freedom House score to be similar over time.¹⁰ We include no other independent variables aside from a dummy variable for Iraq in 2004; in this sense the models here may be thought to represent the simple effect of USAID allocations without considering any other time-varying independent variable. We add additional control variables to the equations in subsequent sections.

Table 3.1 presents the results of the regression model distinguishing the impact of DG assistance on the subsectors (model 3.1) and sub-subsectors (model 3.2).

¹⁰ The models were estimated in STATA 11 using the “xtregar” command with fixed year and country effects. These are standard models in wide use in a variety of cross-sectional time-series econometric applications in political science and economics. The models use “dg02i” as the primary dependent variable. This variable imputes the Freedom House scale for those cases with missing data, again following the procedures outlined in our previous work.

Table 3.1: The Impact of USAID DG Sub- and Sub-Subsectoral Allocations in Authoritarian Countries

	Model 3.1		Model 3.2	
	Coeff.	S. Error	Coeff.	S. Error
DG Elections	0.032**	(0.013)	0.034**	(0.014)
DG Rule of Law	0.029	(0.019)	-	-
<i>DG Human Rights</i>	-	-	0.002	(0.048)
<i>DG Non Human Rights</i>	-	-	0.034	(0.021)
DG Civil Society	0.039***	(0.015)	-	-
<i>DG Mass Media</i>	-	-	0.064	(0.137)
<i>DG Non Mass Media</i>	-	-	0.037**	(0.016)
DG Governance	0.006	(0.01)	0.007	(0.01)
Iraq 2004	-2.633**	(1.237)	-2.717**	(1.254)
Intercept	-1.186***	(0.175)	1.161***	(0.176)
Number of observations	702		702	

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Year and country fixed effects not shown.

The results of model 3.1 indicate that USAID DG allocations for Elections and Political Processes, and for Civil Society programs have significant effects on the level of democracy in authoritarian countries. The effect of .032 for USAID DG on elections indicates that for every additional 10 million dollars of DG assistance in this subsector, a country is predicted to be about .3, or one-third of a point higher on the Freedom House democracy score in a given year. The impact of DG assistance on Civil Society programs, as a whole, is also statistically significant and of similar magnitude. We note that the magnitude of the coefficients for Elections and Civil Society in authoritarian countries is very similar to the .046 and .040 values obtained in the 2006 report (page 70) for *all* eligible countries. This indicates that the same two subsectoral categories of assistance appear to be influential when *all* countries are considered and when only authoritarian or autocratic countries are considered as well. The main difference from the findings in the previous report is that in this case, the .029 coefficient for allocations in the Rule of Law subsector is not statistically significant, while Rule of Law allocations did appear to be significant (at a lag of one year) when all countries were considered in the 2006 report.¹¹

Model 3.2 presents the corresponding findings for the sub-subsectoral analysis. The results indicate that neither Mass Media allocations within the overall Civil Society subsector, nor Human Rights allocations within the overall Rule of Law subsector, have significant impacts on Freedom House scores. The explanatory weight in the Civil Society subsector is due to non-media allocations, while neither the Human Rights nor

¹¹ We tested for lag effects and found no significant relationship for lagged Rule of Law allocations among authoritarian countries.

non-Human Rights effects within the Rule of Law subsector are statistically significant. We conclude that USAID DG assistance in Elections and Political Processes, and in non-media oriented Civil Society programming, have the largest positive impacts on Freedom House scores among authoritarian countries in the 1990-2004 time period.

Question 4: What is the impact of USAID DG sub- and sub-subsectoral allocations on Freedom House scores, controlling for U.S. Military Assistance (and other potentially relevant variables)?

We assess whether the effects found in the previous models change once the amount of U.S. military assistance that the country receives is taken into account. We also include a series of additional “control variables” to test the robustness of the effects, using all of time-varying factors that we considered as controls in our previous reports. These include first, a series of US bilateral and multilateral aid variables: the amount of democracy aid the country receives through the National Endowment for Democracy; the amount of democracy aid the country receives from other US Government sources; regional and subregional democracy assistance that is not directly linked to specific programs in the country that would have been captured by the USAID variables already included; democracy assistance from non-US sources; and USAID non-democracy assistance. Second, we add the U.S. military assistance variable, the country’s percentage change in GDP per capital in the past year, an index of political and social conflict, an indicator of state failure, a weighted index of the democratic levels of neighboring countries, and a measure of the country’s population. The reasoning for including all of these variables was established in our previous work.

The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 4.1. and 4.2. The results from these models are not altered if we consider U.S. military assistance as the *only* additional control variable, and hence we present the more comprehensive full model in this section in order to convey all relevant information.

Table 4.1 The Impact of USAID DG Sub- and Sub-Subsectoral Allocations in Authoritarian Countries, Full Model with U.S. Military Assistance and other Control Variables Included

	Model 4.1		Model 4.2	
	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>S. Error</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>S. Error</i>
DG Elections	0.039**	(0.017)	0.042**	(0.018)
DG Rule of Law	0.030	(0.019)	-	-
<i>DG Human Rights</i>	-	-	-0.009	(0.048)
<i>DG Non Human Rights</i>	-	-	0.037*	(0.021)
DG Civil Society	0.041*	(0.024)	-	-

<i>DG Mass Media</i>	-	-	0.086	(0.142)
<i>DG Non Mass Media</i>	-	-	0.039	(0.025)
DG Governance	0.009	(0.012)	0.010	(0.012)
US Military assistance	-0.043	(0.029)	-0.043	(0.029)
Iraq 2004	-2.785*	(1.568)	-2.866*	(1.580)
USAID Non DG	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)
National Endowment for Democracy Funding	0.045	(0.228)	0.052	(0.228)
U.S. Assistance other than USAID or NED	0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)
Regional and Sub-Regional DG	0.007	(0.165)	0.007	(0.165)
Regional and Sub-Regional Non DG	0.002	(0.023)	0.004	(0.023)
Bilateral Non-US Democracy Assistance	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Bilateral Non-Democracy Assistance	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
Annual Growth in GDP Per Capita	0.010***	(0.003)	0.010***	(0.003)
Democratic Diffusion	-0.039	(0.104)	-0.045	(0.105)
Index of Social and Political Conflict	0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)
State Failure Indicator	-0.048	(0.099)	-0.052	(0.099)
Average Population	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	- 3.600***	(0.923)	- 3.564***	(0.927)
Number of observations	702		702	

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country and Year fixed effects not shown.

The results from Table 4.1 largely corroborate the results from Table 3.1. Model 4.1 shows the same results as Model 3.1; both DG assistance on Elections and Political Processes and Civil Society have a positive impact on reducing the level of authoritarianism, once all of the control variables are included. When the sub-subsectoral analysis is carried out in Model 4.2, the results are very similar again to Model 3.2., but here the effect of DG allocations on non-Human Rights programs within the Rule of Law sector attains statistical significance. This result suggests that programs on non-Human Rights have a significant impact on improving the Freedom House index in authoritarian countries, once all of the control variables are included in the model. Regarding the control variables only the dummy variable for Iraq 2004 and the annual growth in GDP per capita resulted statistically significant while US military assistance in itself has no impact on the level of authoritarianism. The Freedom House score deteriorates for Iraq in 2004 while the opposite is true for countries that become wealthier.

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APPENDIX I: LIST OF AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES INCLUDED

Country	Years not free
Afghanistan	1990-2004
Angola	1990, 1992-2004
Albania	1990
United Arab Emirates	1990-2004
Azerbaijan	1993-1996, 2000-2004
Burundi	1990-2002
Burkina Faso	1990-1991
Bahrain	1990-2001
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-1995
Belarus	1996-2004
Brunei Darussalam	1990-2004
Bhutan	1990-2004
Central African Republic	1990-1992, 2003-2004
China	1990-2004
Cote d'Ivoire	1993-1996, 2000, 2002-2004
Cameroon	1990-2004
Congo, Republic of the	1990, 1997-1999
Cuba	1990-2004
Djibouti	1990-1998
Algeria	1992-2004
Egypt	1992-2004
Eritrea	1993-1994, 1999-2004
Ethiopia (incl. Eritrea)	1990-1991, 1993
Ethiopia	1994
Georgia	1991
Ghana	1990
Guinea	1990-2004
Gambia	1994-2000
Guinea-Bissau	1990-1993
Equatorial Guinea	1990-2004
Haiti	1991-1993, 2000-2004
Indonesia	1990-1997
Iran	1990-2004
Iraq	1990-2004
Jordan	2002

Kazakhstan	1994-2004
Kenya	1990-2001
Kyrgyzstan	2000-2004
Cambodia	1990-1992, 1995-2004
Kuwait	1990-1991
Laos	1990-2004
Lebanon	1990, 1993-2004
Liberia	1990-1996, 2000-2003
Libya	1990-2004
Lesotho	1990
Morocco	1992
Maldives	1990-2004
Mali	1990
Myanmar (Burma)	1990-2004
Mozambique	1990, 1993
Mauritania	1990-2004
Malawi	1990-1993
Niger	1990-1991, 1996-1998
Nigeria	1993-1997
Oman	1990-2004
Pakistan	1999-2004
Peru	1992
Korea, Democratic People's Rep (N)	1990-2004
Qatar	1990-2004
Romania	1990
Russian Federation	2004
Rwanda	1990-2004
Saudi Arabia	1990-2004
Sudan	1990-2004
Sierra Leone	1990-1995, 1997
Somalia	1990-2004
Swaziland	1990-2004
Seychelles	1990-1991
Syria	1990-2004
Chad	1990-2004
Togo	1990-1998, 2002-2004
Tajikistan	1992-2004
Turkmenistan	1991-2004
Tunisia	1992-2004
Tanzania	1990-1994

Uganda	1990-1993, 2000-2001
Uzbekistan	1991-2004
Vietnam	1990-2004
West Bank and Gaza	1997-2004
Yemen	1990-1991, 1994-2002
Yugoslavia (Socialist Rep)	1991
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)	1992-1998
Zaire	1990-1996
Congo, Democratic Republic of / Za	1997-2004
Zambia	1990
Zimbabwe	1999-2004